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Anyone familiar with Russell’s work on the multiple-relation theory of 
judgment will at some point have puzzled over the map of the ﬁve-term 
understanding complex at the end of Chapter 1, Part ii of his Theory of 
Knowledge (1913). Russell presents the map with the intention of clarify-
ing what goes on when a subject S understands the “proposition” that A 
and B are similar. But the map raises more questions than it answers. In 
this paper I present and develop some of the central issues that arise from 
Russell’s map, and I offer an interpretation of it that reﬂects his evolving 
views in the manuscript. I argue that multiple lines in the map are not 
meant to represent many relations, but rather one comprehensive mul-
tiple relation of understanding. And I argue that such a relation relates 
in a complex way due to the distinctive nature of its relata. 
 
 
1. introduction 
 
t the end of Chapter i, Part ii of his Theory of Knowledge 
manuscript, Bertrand Russell presents us with a map of 
the ﬁve-term understanding complex. The map plays a 
very important role for him. He says that it will help make clearer what 
goes on when, as he puts it, a subject understands a proposition, spe-
ciﬁcally, when S understands that A and B are similar. Although Rus-
sell hoped the map would illuminate the results of his previous inves-
tigations, it is quite puzzling. Many scholars remain unsure about how 
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it is meant to be interpreted. Here is Russell’s map on page 118 of 
Theory of Knowledge:  
Map A 
 
 In this paper, I will present and develop some of the central con-
ceptual questions that the map raises, and suggest answers to those 
questions that are most in keeping with Russell’s views in Theory of 
Knowledge. I begin with a brief sketch of his shifting views on propo-
sitions from 1903 to 1913. I then examine two central questions about 
the sorts of relations which Russell wanted to depict with his map, and 
I argue in favour of the interpretation that takes all the lines in the 
map to stand for one multiple comprehensive relation of understand-
ing. Next, I address questions concerning the way the lines (or arrows) 
of the map depict the nature and exact role of the relation of under-
standing itself—how it is meant to be different from the relation of 
acquaintance; how it is connected to the logical form; and whether it 
is meant to incorporate in some way the so-called “position relations” 
Russell introduced. Finally, I brieﬂy consider the question of whether 
the map was in fact meant to represent the speciﬁc ﬁve-term under-
standing complex, or the form of such a complex. 
 I must warn readers that my concern in this paper has not been to 
advance large historical and interpretative theses about Russell’s mul-
tiple-relation theory of judgment, its development, and the reasons 
why he abandoned the theory. Much valuable work has been and con-
tinues to be done in this area.1 My aim has also not been to trace the 
 
1  See, to name just a few: Nicholas Griffin, “Russell’s Multiple Relation Theory 
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historical development of Russell’s maps of judgment and how such 
development reﬂects his changing views. Important and illuminating 
work has been done in this area too.2 My aim in this paper has been 
modest, but with potentially very fruitful effects for the above-
mentioned avenues of research. Through close reading and analysis 
of the relevant passages of Theory of Knowledge, I have tried to high-
light the most pressing questions about Russell’s map of the under-
standing complex as well as the tensions in the text which make an-
swering those questions challenging. Thus, even if the reader does not 
end up agreeing with my interpretation of his map, I hope that it will 
be clear that a proper understanding of the map is vital to any inter-
pretation of Theory of Knowledge which seeks to explain his most ma-
ture version of the multiple-relation theory of judgment. 
 In Map A, we see four straight lines linking the subject S to terms 
A, B, similarity, and the general form of dual complexes R(x, y). But 
this is not all that Russell chooses to represent with Map A, for if this 
were the case his map would have looked much simpler. It could have 
looked like this: 
Map A-1 
 
of Judgment” (1985); Gregory Landini, “A New Interpretation of Russell’s Mul-
tiple Relation Theory of Judgment” (1991); Peter Hanks, “How Wittgenstein De-
feated Russell’s Multiple Relation Theory of Judgment” (2007); Rosalind Carey, 
Russell and Wittgenstein on the Nature of Judgment (2007); Christopher Pincock, 
“Russell’s Last (and Best) Multiple-Relation Theory of Judgment” (2008); James 
Connelly, “On ‘Props’, Wittgenstein’s June 1913 Letter, and Russell’s ‘Paralysis’ ” 
(2011). 
2  See in particular Carey, “The Development of Russell’s Diagrams for Judgment” 
(2003). 
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 Map A-1 represents the multiple relation of understanding relating 
the subject S to the terms A, B, similarity, and the form R(x, y), but 
this is all it does. Russell’s Map A, on the other hand, has further lines 
which connect the terms of the multiple relation of understanding be-
tween themselves. It is on the status of these further lines that we will 
focus our attention in the next section. For now, I want to note that 
both diagrams above—Map A and Map A-1—are, on the face of it, in 
keeping with the view that Russell is expounding in Theory of 
Knowledge: namely, that when we understand the “proposition”3 we 
do not stand in a single dual relation to one entity, but rather in a 
multiple relation to a number of different entities, some of which may, 
but need not, constitute an existing complex. 
 This view departs signiﬁcantly from Russell’s views in the ten years 
prior. In The Principles of Mathematics (1903), he held that understand-
ing is a dyadic relation between a subject and a single entity he called 
a “proposition”. He thought of propositions as non-linguistic com-
plexes composed of distinct sorts of entities (“terms”)—concrete par-
ticulars such as Socrates (“things”), universals (“concepts”), and de-
noting concepts (also “denoting complexes”). Thus, for example, the 
proposition The most famous student of Plato is wise consists for Russell 
of the denoting concept the most famous student of Plato and the uni-
versal wisdom. The proposition Alice is wise contains the particular girl 
Alice and the universal wisdom. But what does the truth or falsehood 
of such a proposition consist in? The proposition Alice is wise exists 
whether or not it is true and there is no other complex Alice being wise 
that is the truth-maker. There is, therefore, really nothing informative 
that can be said about the truth of the proposition. In Russell’s view, 
“truth” and “falsehood” are unanalyzable. Even more troublingly, 
false propositions exist. Let’s say that I falsely judge that Alice is not 
wise. The false proposition Alice is not wise is in the world along with 
the true proposition Alice is wise. According to the 1903 view, the 
world is a very strange place indeed. 
 Circa 1904, during the time that Russell published the three instal-
ments of “Meinong’s Theory of Complexes and Assumptions”, he 
seemed to be sympathetic to the Meinongian view that to judge a false 
proposition is simply to judge something that has being but does not 
 
3  I use quotation marks here because, as we will see shortly, Russell of 1913 did not 
believe in the existence of propositions. 
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exist.4 After “On Denoting” (1905), however, his views with regard to 
propositions begin to shift. Deﬁnite descriptions are no longer re-
garded as indicating denoting concepts occurring in propositions. 
Russell eliminates ordinary proper names such as “Apollo”, and both 
ordinary proper names and deﬁnite descriptions are given contextual 
deﬁnitions in the contexts of the statements in which they occur. The 
existence of such names no longer compels him to admit the Homeric 
gods into ontology. 
 Though Russell retained his ontology of propositions (with “truth” 
and “falsehood” as primitive), by 1906 he began to wonder whether 
contextual deﬁnitions of propositions might avoid having to accept 
them as sui generis entities, thus avoiding the problems of the 1903 
view. Propositions would thus be treated within the context of state-
ments of judgment—and thus when a subject S judges that Alice is 
wise, S is no longer to be regarded as standing in a judging relation to 
a proposition. Instead, S stands in a multiple relation to the entities 
which, if S judges truly, would compose a fact (complex) of Alice being 
wise.5  
 By 1910, in “On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood”, we ﬁnd that 
Russell fully abandons his former propositions and endorses a multi-
ple-relation theory of judgment. He states:  
 
Every judgment is a relation of a mind to several objects, one of which is 
a relation; the judgment is true when the relation which is one of the 
objects relates the other objects, otherwise it is false. 
 (Philosophical Essays, p. 181/156; Papers 6: 122) 
 
At this point, as well as in his subsequent work The Problems of Philos-
ophy (1912), Russell held that judgment is not a dyadic relation 
 
4  See “Meinong’s Theory of Complexes and Assumptions i” (1904), p. 219, where 
Russell suggests that false propositions must have some kind of “extra-mental sub-
sistence”; and “Meinong’s Theory of Complexes and Assumptions iii” (1904), pp. 
519–24, for a more detailed discussion of this view by Russell (Papers 4: 445 and 
469–74, respectively). 
5  Russell’s paper “On The Nature of Truth” (1906) is a valuable source for those who 
wish to trace the emergence of Russell’s multiple-relation theory of judgment. There-
in, in sec. iii on pp. 44–9 (Papers 5: 450–4), he outlines two theories—one that ad-
mits of “objective falsehoods” and one that does not; it is the latter that will become 
his multiple-relation theory. He excluded the section in reprinting the paper as “The 
Monistic Theory of Truth” in Philosophical Essays (1910, 1966). 
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J(S, p) but a multiple relation J(S, a, R, b). That is, when S judges 
that a stands in a relation R to b, the subject S stands in a multiple 
relation of judging to a and R and b. Accordingly, S judges truly if there 
is a corresponding complex aRb, and S judges falsely if there is no 
such corresponding complex. 
 Finally, in his 1913 manuscript Theory of Knowledge, Russell added 
the logical form R(x, y) of the would-be dual complex as one of the 
terms of the judging or understanding relation. Thus, instead of J(S, 
a, R, b), he has J(S, a, R, b, R(x, y)). The same holds of the under-
standing relation: he has U(S, a, R, b,  ), where  is the form of a dual 
complex. It is this version of the view that ﬁnds its representation in 
Russell’s Map A, on page 118 in Theory of Knowledge, to which we now 
turn. 
 
2. two central questions about map a 
 
The two main questions that will be examined here are: (1) in his rep-
resentation of the understanding complex, why did Russell choose to 
draw Map A, rather than Map A-1? And more speciﬁcally, (2) in Map 
A, what is supposed to be the role of the additional lines that connect 
similarity to A and B, and that connect the form R(x, y) to A, B, and 
similarity? The hope is that through a close examination of these two 
questions, we will gain insight into how Russell is thinking about the 
multiple-relation theory of judgment in Theory of Knowledge. 
 (1) Why did Russell choose to draw Map A rather than Map A-1? The 
following passage can give us a clue as to his motivation: 
 
 In order to understand “A and B are similar”, we must be acquainted 
with A and B and similarity, and with the general form of symmetrical 
dual complexes. […] But these separate acquaintances, even if they all coex-
ist in one momentary experience, do not constitute understanding of the one 
proposition “A and B are similar”, which obviously brings the three constitu-
ents and the form into relation with each other, so that all become parts of one 
complex. It is this comprehensive relation which is the essential thing about the 
understanding of a proposition. Our problem is, therefore, to discover the 
nature of this comprehensive relation.  (TK, p. 112; italics mine) 
 
Thus, what seems to motivate Russell’s choice of Map A is his desire 
to represent the relation of understanding as a “comprehensive rela-
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tion”, a relation very different from a number of separate but simul-
taneous acquaintance relations. Map A-1 could be seen as represent-
ing either four separate acquaintance relations going from S to the 
terms A, B, similarity, and R(x, y), or as one multiple acquaintance-
type relation going from S to the four terms. In the above passage, 
Russell explicitly rules out the identiﬁcation of the understanding re-
lation with four separate acquaintance relations, but he also rules out 
the identiﬁcation of the understanding relation with one multiple ac-
quaintance-type relation. When he says that the understanding rela-
tion “brings the three constituents and the form into relation with 
each other”, it is clear that the understanding relation is more than an 
acquaintance relation between a subject and objects of acquaintance, 
and that it is the nature of this “more” that Russell tries to represent 
with his Map A. We will be looking more closely at the difference 
between acquaintance and understanding in Russell in section 3, but 
for our purposes here, it is sufficient to point out that Russell did not 
think of the understanding relation as a special type of acquaintance 
relation. Let’s now consider the second question. 
 (2) In Russell’s Map A, what is the role of additional lines that connect 
similarity to A and B, and that connect the form R(x, y) to A, B, and 
similarity? Answering this question is made difficult by his own re-
marks. Right after the drawing of Map A on page 118, Russell pro-
ceeds to explain it as follows: 
 
In this ﬁgure, one relation goes from S to the four objects; one relation goes 
from R(x, y) to similarity, and another to A and B, while one relation goes 
from similarity to A and B.  (TK, p. 118; italics mine) 
 
Let’s refer to each of the so-called “relations” that Russell lists as fol-
lows: r1 for the relation that goes from S to A, B, similarity, and R(x, 
y); r2 for the relation from R(x, y) to similarity; r3 for the relation from 
R(x, y) to A and B; and r4 for the relation from similarity to A and B. 
With these drawn in, his Map A looks like this:6 
 
 
 
6  Map A-2 represents r4 (and r3) as one line that then branches out to A and B. In so 
doing, I tried to stay faithful to Russell’s Map A, on the one hand, and to his des-
cription of it on p. 118, on the other. For a discussion of the possibility that these 
branching lines are intended to represent position relation(s), see §3.3 below. 
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Map A-2 
 
Now, if we are to take Russell’s words in the passage on page 118 at 
face value, there are four relations in an understanding complex.7 But 
how can this be when Russell seems clearly committed, in the passage 
on page 112 quoted above, to there being just one multiple compre-
hensive relation of understanding which acts as the relating relation in 
the understanding complex? Let us consider the following ﬁve ways 
of resolving the tension between these two passages. 
 (i) One might wish to claim that r2, r3, and r4 are sui generis relating 
relations, independent of the relation of understanding. However, if this 
were the case, then the map would be representing S’s understanding 
that A and B are similar (presumably with r1 ) as well as the actual 
complex A being similar to B (with r4 ). But this cannot be the case, 
since with the multiple-relation theory, Russell is supposed to allow 
us to judge a “proposition” without committing ourselves to its truth, 
that is, without committing ourselves to the existence of the 
 
7  An anonymous referee has suggested that, despite what Russell says on p. 118, r2 and 
r3 are better understood as one relation rather than two. The reason provided is that 
in Map A there is no arrow going from R(x, y) to A and B, whereas there is indeed 
an arrow pointing towards similarity. Thus, the suggestion is that it is more natural 
to view r2 and r3 as one relation that brings together the form R(x, y) with A, B, and 
similarity. I take this to be an interesting suggestion worth exploring. However, I 
must point out that such a reading would clash not just with what Russell writes on 
p. 118, but also with the diagrams found on the verso of the manuscript of Appendix 
A.5, in Appendix B.2, Papers 7: 200. Both diagrams in Appendix B.2 are taken to be 
precursors of Map A in TK, and they both contain arrows going from R(x, y) to A 
and B. 
 Mapping Understanding in Russell’s Theory of Knowledge 109 
 
  
c:\users\arlene\documents\rj\type3602\rj 3602 088.docx 2016-12-16 11:25 
corresponding complex. Russell is very careful throughout Chapter 1 
of Part ii of Theory of Knowledge,8 as well as in other parts of Theory of 
Knowledge,9 to distinguish the would-be complex A being similar to B 
from the understanding complex S understands A and B are similar. 
Since understanding that A is similar to B can occur without A being 
similar to B, it seems safe to say that r4 is not meant to represent a 
relating relation within an existing complex A being similar to B. 
 Similarly, r2 and r3 cannot be genuine relating relations, independ-
ent of the relation of understanding, for they would be relating the 
form R(x, y) to similarity and the form R(x, y) to A and B. It is far 
from clear what sorts of complexes this would generate and to what 
end. But, crucially, Russell states unambiguously that the logical form 
is only a constituent of an understanding complex (and not of a simi-
larity complex, were it to exist),10 thus ruling out the possibility that r2 
and r3 are relating relations in non-cognitive complexes. 
 (ii) Could r2, r3, and r4 stand for non-relating relations, independent of 
the relation of understanding? This too is extremely unlikely, for what 
would be the purpose of such relations? And how should they be 
thought of ? If they were conceived to be non-relating relations such 
as similarity within the understanding complex, then they are clearly 
being misrepresented in the map; that is, they should be represented 
as terms, with dots and names for relations, rather than lines with ar-
rows. But more to the point, Russell says nothing to suggest that sub-
ject’s understanding of the “proposition” A and B are similar, gener-
ates any terms in addition to A, B, similarity, and the form R(x, y); 
that is, there is nothing in the manuscript to suggest that further non-
relating relations need to be added as terms when S judges that A and 
B are similar. 
 Another possibility is that r2, r3, and r4 were envisioned as non-
relating relations of a different sort than similarity, hence the difference 
in representation. However, this too seems rather unlikely, since 
 
8  See in particular pp. 116–17 of TK. 
9  See, for instance, pp. 99 and 149 of TK. 
10  Take, for example, the following passage: “In an actual complex, the general form is 
not presupposed; but when we are concerned with a proposition which may be false, 
and where, therefore, the actual complex is not given, we have only, as it were, the 
‘idea’ or ‘suggestion’ of the terms being united in such a complex; and this, evidently, 
requires that the general form of the merely supposed complex should be given” 
(TK , p. 116). 
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Russell says nothing about r2, r3, and r4’s possible special role. Indeed, 
the fact that Russell does not take the time to separate out and explain 
the role of what I have here referred to as “relations r2, r3, and r4” 
indicates that he did not think that he was introducing any new sort 
of entity with a special new role at this point in the manuscript. It is 
thus much more likely that the map is merely illustrating the results 
of his previous discussion, rather than introducing new concepts. 
 (iii) If indeed r2, r3 and r4 are neither sui generis relating relations 
independent of the relation of understanding, nor non-relating rela-
tions independent of the relation of understanding, then what else can 
they be? One possibility is that r2, r3 and r4 are not relations at all and that 
Russell simply misspoke when he referred to them as such. According to 
this interpretation, of the four “relations” r1, r2, r3, and r4 the only gen-
uine relation is r1, and it is by virtue of this multiple relation r1 holding 
between S and the four terms that S is able to understand the different 
roles that the other four terms play in the complex and their relation-
ships to one another. 
 In fact, immediately preceding the map, Russell elaborates on the 
different ways in which the terms enter the understanding complex. 
He writes: 
 
 It is obvious, in the ﬁrst place, that S is related to the four other terms 
in a way different from that in which any of the four other terms are 
related to each other. (It is to be observed that we can derive from our 
ﬁve-term complex a complex having any smaller number of terms by 
replacing any one or more of the terms by “something”. If S is replaced 
by “something”, the resulting complex is of a different form from that 
which results from replacing any other term by “something”. This ex-
plains what is meant by saying that S enters in a different way from the 
other constituents.) It is obvious, in the second place, that R(x, y) enters 
in a different way from the other three objects, and that “similarity” has 
a different relation to R(x, y) from that which A and B have, while A and 
B have the same relation to R(x, y). Also, because we are dealing with a 
proposition asserting a symmetrical relation between A and B, A and B 
have each the same relation to “similarity”, whereas, if we had been deal-
ing with an asymmetrical relation, they would have had different rela-
tions to it. (TK, p. 117) 
 
Thus one could make the case that Russell, in trying to come up with 
a visual representation of the way in which different terms occur in 
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the understanding complex, helped himself to further lines and arrows 
and corresponding talk of “relations” (r2, r3, and r4 ) in an attempt to 
capture those different roles. But all he really means here when he 
mentions “relations” is simply different relationships and ways of oc-
curring. Thus with r2 and r3 Russell wishes to show that the form R(x, 
y) has a peculiar role: through S’s understanding of the form, S un-
derstands that A, B, and similarity would constitute a dual complex of 
the type “something stands in some relation to something”; similarity 
enters in such a way that when S is related to it through understand-
ing, S understands that it is a dyadic symmetrical relation, and so on. 
 The beneﬁt of this interpretation of Map A is that it does not 
strongly conﬂict with Russell’s main commitments in Chapter 1 of 
Part ii of Theory of Knowledge or with that manuscript more broadly. 
However, it certainly leaves unanswered the following questions: why 
did he choose to represent r2, r3, and r4 in the same way as he did r1, 
instead of, say, representing them with dotted lines (thus indicating 
their different ontological status)? And more to the point, why did 
Russell refer to them repeatedly as “relations” if he did not think of 
them as such? The next two interpretations weigh in on these ques-
tions. 
 (iv) In (iii) above, it was assumed that Russell misspoke when on 
page 118 of the manuscript, after presenting Map A, he referred to r2, 
r3, and r4 as separate relations. But what if we interpret Russell as deliber-
ately choosing to refer to a relation in each case, but as speaking somewhat 
loosely in referring to these as separate relations? On the latter interpreta-
tion, r1, r2, r3, and r4 are all “parts” of one comprehensive cognitive 
relation of understanding—call it r, and by singling them out Russell 
was attempting to draw attention to different relationships that are es-
tablished between the terms when the relation of understanding is ex-
empliﬁed in the complex. 
 Of course, the talk of “parts” of a relation should not be taken lit-
erally here: ﬁrstly, it is not clear what (if any) metaphysical sense can 
be made of a “part of a relation”; and secondly, Russell does not say 
anything that can be construed as a commitment to relations having 
parts. But there is certainly nothing incoherent about him drawing 
attention to parts of an understanding complex by appealing to differ-
ent ways in which terms are related by the understanding relation. 
 To say that r1, r2, r3, and r4 are all actually just one relation, is in 
keeping with his talk of a comprehensive relation of understanding in 
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the passage on page 112 of Theory of Knowledge quoted above. This 
reading has further textual support on page 114 where, in the context 
of a discussion of a deﬁnition of “proposition”, he notes that when 
two different people judge that A and B are similar, the two judgment 
complexes do not just share the same objects (terms), but they also 
both “bring the objects into the same relation to each other”. This talk 
of a cognitive relation “bringing together” the terms and putting them 
in relation “to each other” also appears in The Problems of Philosophy 
(1912). There Russell talks of the relation of believing being the sort of 
relation that “knits together” its terms, rather than standing between 
the subject and each of the terms individually (PP2, pp. 126–7). 
 One might worry that taking all the lines in Map A to represent just 
one relation of understanding, while in keeping with the passages on 
pages 112 and 114 in Theory of Knowledge and pages 126–7 in the Prob-
lems, leaves unresolved the tension with the passages on pages 117 and 
118 where Russell refers to r1, r2, r3, and r4 as distinct relations. But I 
wish to suggest that the tension only appears to be signiﬁcant if we 
take Russell’s remarks on pages 117–18 literally. If, however, we take 
him to be speaking loosely of different relations, the tension dissipates. 
And there is a lot to be said in favour of this “loose speak” interpreta-
tion. Firstly, as the discussion in (i) and (ii) above has shown, inter-
preting r2, r3, and r4 as sui generis relations distinct from the relation of 
understanding plainly conﬂicts with much of what he argues for in 
Theory of Knowledge. Secondly, in the context of discussing a diagram, 
it would have been easy for him to slip from talking about different 
segments of a line to talking about different relations, especially when 
the line is in fact meant to represent a single relation and when Russell 
is trying to have the reader focus on different parts of an understand-
ing complex brought about by the relation. And thirdly, as we will see 
in (v) below, there is hardly any support for an interpretation accord-
ing to which r1, r2, r3, and r4 are all distinct cognitive relations of un-
derstanding. 
 (v) Finally, we come to consider the possibility that r1, r2, r3, and r4 are 
all distinct relations of understanding. According to this interpretation, 
we should take Russell’s reference to distinct relations on pages 117–
18 of Theory of Knowledge literally; but, contra (i) and (ii), r2, r3, and r4 
do not have an importantly different status from r1 —they are all cog-
nitive relations, i.e., they are all relations of understanding. 
 This reading does not sit well with the passages referred to above 
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that mention the understanding relation as one multiple comprehen-
sive relation rather than many. But perhaps this could be gotten 
around by saying that r1 is indeed the one multiple relation of under-
standing that relates S to the four subjects; whereas r2, r3, and r4 are 
relations that come into being once r1 is exempliﬁed. That is, once S 
stands in an understanding relation to A, B, similarity, and the logical 
form R(x, y), S understands how similarity ought to relate A and B 
and what form the would-be complex takes. 
 As tempting as this interpretation might be, it is very difficult to 
make it work. Firstly, Russell did not want to allow for instantiation-
in-stages of the understanding relation. For him, there seems to be no 
doubt that when subject S understands a proposition, the instantia-
tion of the relation happens all at once. Secondly, for r2, r3, and r4 to 
be cognitive, they cannot exist independently of the subject S; that is, 
it is not the form R(x, y) that understands how A, B, and similarity are 
to be put together, and it is not similarity that understands A and B. 
Thus if relations r2, r3, and r4 are to qualify at all as cognitive relations 
of understanding, they must have a subject as one of their relata. But 
then r2, r3, and r4 would have to be construed to somehow include r1, 
and that is not what passage on page 118 suggests. 
 It would also not help matters to start reinterpreting Russell’s deﬁ-
nition of a multiple relation as having to do with multiple relations—r1, 
r2, r3, and r4 —rather than one relation relating multiple relata. Russell 
was quite clear on the fact that the “multiplicity” of a relation is tied 
to its adicity. In Chapter xii of the Problems, Russell characterizes mul-
tiple relations as relations that hold between more than two terms (i.e. 
their adicity is greater than two). His examples of such relations are: 
between (“A is between B and C”), jealousy, and—curiously—wishing 
to promote marriage (“A wishes B to promote C’s marriage with D”) 
(PP2, pp. 124–5). Thus, when Russell takes cognitive relations such as 
judging, believing, and understanding to be multiple relations, all he ever 
seems to want to say is that they relate more than two terms. 
 In light of all of the above, if Map A is to stand any chance at illu-
minating Russell’s discussion of the multiple-relation theory of judg-
ment, it would be best interpreted along the lines suggested in (iv) 
above. This is not to say that such a reading is perfectly clear, but 
merely that it is the most charitable to Russell and clashes the least 
with his other philosophical commitments in Theory of Knowledge. 
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3. on the nature of the comprehensive relation 
of understanding 
 
Although the interpretation (iv) above has helped us to reconcile some 
tensions in Russell’s Theory of Knowledge, the exact role and nature of 
the one multiple comprehensive relation of understanding in Map A 
remains far from clear. In this section, I will try to shed some light on 
this relation by considering the following questions: How is the rela-
tion of understanding different from the relation of acquaintance, 
according to Russell? Does logical form impact the understanding re-
lation, and if so, in what way? And ﬁnally, what might be the relation-
ship between the understanding relation and the position relations in 
Map A? 
 
3.1. The understanding relation and acquaintance 
 According to Russell, in order to understand the “proposition” A 
and B are similar, we must be acquainted with A, B, similarity, and the 
form R(x, y).11 The requirement that we be acquainted with A, B, and 
similarity was something that he had already discussed at length in his 
1911 “Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description”. 
For instance, in this paper Russell states his principle as follows: 
“Whenever a relation of supposing or judging occurs, the terms to which the 
supposing or judging mind is related by the relation of supposing or judging 
must be terms with which the mind in question is acquainted.” 12  He 
thought the truth of this principle to be evident, for it was obvious to 
him that “we cannot make a judgment or a supposition without know-
ing what it is that we are making our judgment or supposition about” 
(ibid.). 
 By the time that Russell was engaged in writing the Theory of 
Knowledge manuscript, the main change from “Knowledge by Ac-
quaintance and Knowledge by Description” and the Problems had to 
do with the entities to which the principle was supposed to apply. That 
is, the form of the would-be complex was added as one of the constit-
uents with which we must be acquainted if we are to understand a 
 
11  Russell states this frequently. On p. 112 of TK, he writes: “In order to understand 
‘A and B are similar’, we must be acquainted with A and B and similarity, and with 
the general form of symmetrical dual complexes.” The same thought is repeated on 
p. 114 of TK. 
12  Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 11 (1910–11): 118; Papers 6: 155. 
 Mapping Understanding in Russell’s Theory of Knowledge 115 
 
  
c:\users\arlene\documents\rj\type3602\rj 3602 088.docx 2016-12-16 11:25 
proposition. I will discuss in more detail below what the addition of 
the form brings to understanding, but here I’d like to brieﬂy discuss a 
different issue. When Russell says that “when we understand, those 
objects with which we must be acquainted when we understand, and 
those only, are object-constituents […] of the understanding-com-
plex” (TK, p. 117), he does not clearly state whether acquaintance 
with the constituents is supposed to happen prior to understanding 
the proposition, at the same time as understanding the proposition, or 
indeed if the acquaintance relation is in some sense a constituent of 
the understanding relation. How should we understand him on this 
issue? 
 Initially, Russell is very careful to distinguish between acquaintance 
and understanding. On page 108 of Theory of Knowledge he stresses 
that the two relations are “very widely different in logical form, and 
give rise to quite different logical problems”. Acquaintance is a dual 
relation that holds between a subject and an object; understanding, 
on the other hand, is a multiple relation that holds between a subject 
and multiple objects. Another crucial difference has to do with truth 
and falsehood. Acquaintance involves objects that are not true or false, 
but simply “are” (p. 108), whereas understanding is a propositional 
cognitive relation concerned with truth and falsehood. From all this, 
it looks as if Russell is thinking of the understanding relation as im-
portantly distinct from the acquaintance relation. It would appear that 
regardless of whether or not acquaintance with the constituents of the 
“proposition” in fact happens prior to or at the same time as under-
standing, it is the understanding relation and not the acquaintance 
relation(s) that feature in the understanding complex. 
 However, what starts to muddle the distinction between the relation 
of understanding and the relation of acquaintance is Russell’s inter-
changeable use of the two terms in his discussion of logical form. For 
instance, on page 113 he writes that he wishes to consider the question 
how we can be sure that acquaintance with the “form” is involved in 
understanding a proposition. But then, when on page 116 he comes to 
consider this question, he talks of understanding the form being re-
quired for understanding the proposition; in fact, at this point, he even 
puts the initial question as: “What is the proof that we must understand 
the ‘form’ before we can understand the proposition?” (italics mine). 
 I suggest, however, not taking these examples as evidence of Rus-
sell’s general lack of clarity about the distinction between acquaintance 
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and understanding relations in the context of understanding a proposi-
tion, but rather as his lack of clarity on the exact type of cognitive 
relation to be invoked when it comes to logical forms. In fact, he even 
confesses to as much in the chapter on logical data in Theory of 
Knowledge, when he says: “It should be said, to begin with, that ‘ac-
quaintance’ has, perhaps, a somewhat different meaning, where logi-
cal objects are concerned, from that which it has when particulars are 
concerned” (p. 97). Later, when he returns to this issue within the 
context of discussion of various examples of understanding, Russell 
concludes that he does not think that there is in fact any difference 
between understanding and acquaintance when it comes to the logical 
form “something has some relation to something” (p. 130). 
 
3.2. The understanding relation and logical form 
 It is now time to consider the special role that the logical form is 
supposed to play in our understanding of a “proposition” and how the 
form might affect the relation of understanding itself. Let’s begin by 
looking at the way that Russell motivates the introduction of the form 
in Theory of Knowledge: 
 
I held formerly that the objects alone sufficed, and that the “sense” of 
the relation of understanding would put them in the right order; this, 
however, no longer seems to me to be the case. Suppose we wish to un-
derstand “A and B are similar”. It is essential that our thought should, 
as is said, “unite” or “synthesize” the two terms and the relation; but we 
cannot actually “unite” them, since either A and B are similar, in which 
case they are already united, or they are dissimilar, in which case no 
amount of thinking can force them to be united. The process of “uniting” 
which we can effect in thought is the process of bringing them into relation with 
the general form of dual complexes. The form being “something and some-
thing have a certain relation”, our understanding of the proposition 
might be expressed in the words “something, namely A, and something, 
namely B, have a certain relation, namely similarity”. [...] In an actual 
complex, the general form is not presupposed; but when we are con-
cerned with a proposition which may be false, and where, therefore, the 
actual complex is not given, we have only, as it were, the “idea” or “sug-
gestion” of the terms being united in such a complex; and this, evidently, 
requires that the general form of the merely supposed complex should 
be given. More simply, in order to understand “A and B are similar”, we 
must know what is supposed to be done with A and B and similarity, i.e. what 
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it is for two terms to have a relation; that is, we must understand the form of 
the complex which must exist if the proposition is true.   
(TK, p. 116; italics mine) 
 
As Russell points out in this passage, he no longer holds that the rela-
tion of understanding has “direction” or “sense”. While in the Prob-
lems he thought of a relation of understanding “arranging” the subject 
and objects “in a certain order” (PP2, p. 127), the relation of under-
standing does no such thing in the Theory of Knowledge. In Chapter 
vii, Part i Russell spends time trying to convince the reader that the 
“from-and-to” character that we tend to attribute to relations such as 
“before” and “after” is merely apparent. Relations are not like goods 
trucks, with a hook in front and an eye behind. Such metaphors, Rus-
sell warns, are “positively misleading” since “before” and “after” only 
differ linguistically; thus, he concludes, “whatever a relation is, it must 
be symmetrical with respect to its two ends” (TK, p. 86). Applying 
this to the relation of understanding, we see how Russell thought that 
it too can have no essential “sense” or “from and to” character as part 
of its nature, nothing that would ontologically discriminate between 
what sorts of entities can take up the “hook” slot and what sorts of 
entities can take up the “eye” slot. 
 What, then, is meant to replace the “sense” of the relation of un-
derstanding? In the above passage, Russell suggests that in the case of 
symmetrical dual complexes such as “A and B are similar”, it is the 
form “something and something have a certain relation” that is crucial 
to our understanding of “A and B are similar”. By understanding or 
being acquainted with the general form of dual complexes, we under-
stand “what it is for two terms to have a relation” (TK, p. 116). 
 But how exactly is the form meant to perform this role and what is 
the nature of such an entity? With respect to the nature of logical form, 
Russell is certain that it must be “something exceedingly simple” (TK, 
p. 114), i.e., it must not contain any constituents (ibid.). Forms for 
him are what different groups of complexes have in common—the 
form of all subject-predicate complexes is “something has some pred-
icate”, the form of all dual complexes is “something has some relation 
to something”, etc. But despite these linguistic descriptions of differ-
ent forms, we shouldn’t think of them as linguistic entities or indeed 
as entities that have structure. The form, for Russell, “is a structure” 
(TK, p. 114), and if we are struggling to grasp what exactly he might 
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mean by this, it is probably because, as he puts it, “the language is not 
well adapted for speaking of such objects” (ibid ). 
 In what way is logical form supposed to aid our understanding of 
propositions and how does it replace the “sense” previously attributed 
to the relation of understanding? Russell does not give us much guid-
ance on this, and where one would expect an explanation of some 
kind, we are merely presented with the map. Let’s take another look 
at Map A, on page 102 above. I have already argued in favour of the 
interpretation of the map according to which all of the lines repre-
sented in it stand for only one relating relation—the multiple compre-
hensive relation of understanding. However, the multiplicity of lines 
and arrows in Map A suggests that the relation of understanding re-
lates its constituents in a complex way. This way of relating does not 
appear to be for Russell a product of the nature of the relation of un-
derstanding itself; rather, the relation of understanding seems to be 
affected (or informed, so to speak), by the nature of the terms being 
related, and in particular by the logical form. Thus we can interpret 
Map A as attempting to represent that: (1) standing in an understand-
ing relation to the form R(x, y) helps S understand that the would-be 
complex is dual; (2) standing in an understanding relation to A and B 
and the form helps S understand that A and B are two terms that in a 
would-be complex are related by a dual relation; and (3) standing in 
an understanding relation to similarity and the form helps S under-
stand that similarity is the dual symmetrical relating relation in a 
would-be complex. 
 This interpretation makes repeated reference to the form and its 
centrality in the understanding of the “proposition”. With this, I do 
not wish to indicate, however, that the logical form R(x, y) is supposed 
by itself to structure A, B, and similarity in the understanding com-
plex. I ﬁnd little evidence for such an interpretation of the role of the 
form in Russell. Although the logical form is a structure for him and 
is found to be common to many complexes, there is no reference to 
the form as somehow “structuring” the other constituents of the cog-
nitive complex. 
 It also seems incorrect to interpret the role of the logical form R(x, 
y) as a template through which the understanding relation “reaches 
out” and uniﬁes the constituents of the would-be complex. First, this 
interpretation does not fare well with the map itself, which, although 
it does present the form R(x, y) as central, it certainly does not present 
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it in the forefront of the complex with radiating further lines. This is 
what I have in mind: 
Map A-3 
 
Secondly, this sort of interpretation would imply that understanding 
the form would need to happen ﬁrst, i.e. before the understanding re-
lation reached the other constituents, and there is no indication of 
such sequencing in Russell. And thirdly, he is clear on the fact that 
each of the constituents occurs differently in the complex, thus indi-
cating that it cannot be the logical form all by itself that somehow 
determines the structure of the complex. 
 Therefore, I suggest, each of the constituents, together with the 
form and the understanding relation that relates them all, contributes 
to the particular structure of the understanding complex. This reading 
aligns nicely with the passage on page 117 of Theory of Knowledge, 
quoted in section 2 above, where Russell, immediately before present-
ing us with Map A, points out different ways in which each of the ﬁve 
constituents of the complex—S, A, B, similarity, and the form R(x, 
y)—occur in it. With these different “ways of occurring” he wants to 
show how each of the constituents contributes in its own unique way 
to the resulting structure of the understanding complex. 
 Additional support for this reading can be found in the following 
passage from Chapter iii, Part ii of Theory of Knowledge where Russell 
is reﬂecting on what matters the most in how we characterize and clas-
sify mental facts: 
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In the classiﬁcation of mental facts, various different considerations may 
be brought to bear. There is, ﬁrst, the logical form of the mental fact 
concerned—whether it is a dual or treble or quadruple … relation. Then 
there is the logical character of the objects concerned. Then, when both 
the form of the mental fact and the logical character of the objects are 
given, there is the actual relating relation which is a constituent of the 
fact. In considering these grounds of classiﬁcation, one would naturally 
have expected that the form of the mental fact would be the source of 
the most fundamental divisions. In obedience to this supposition, we be-
gan with dual relations, acquaintance, attention, etc.; and when we came 
to propositional thought, it seemed at ﬁrst as if the change was due to 
the fact that here the cognitive relations concerned were multiple. This 
whole point of view, however, is erroneous. The classiﬁcation of mental 
facts by the logical character of the objects involved turns out to be far more 
important than their classiﬁcation by their own logical form. 
 (TK, p. 131; italics mine) 
 
In this passage, Russell admits that initially (perhaps in the early stages 
of writing Theory of Knowledge), he thought that the distinguishing fea-
ture of mental facts was conferred by the adicity of the cognitive rela-
tion concerned. Acquaintance was supposed to be a dual relation, 
while understanding was supposed to be a multiple relation; hence, 
he thought, it is the adicity of the relation that determines the nature 
of the cognitive fact. However, perhaps during the very writing of 
Chapter i of Part ii (i.e., the chapter which concludes with Map A), 
there was a shift on this issue in Russell; he begins to realize that the 
real impact on the nature of the cognitive fact is conferred by the “log-
ical character” of all of the objects involved. I have argued here that it 
is this interplay of the understanding relation with the entities—each 
of which has a very different logical character—that gives rise to the 
understanding complex, and that it is the complex logical structure of 
such a complex that Russell is at pains to represent with his Map A. 
 
3.3. The understanding relation and position relations 
 For the sake of simplicity, for most of Chapter i, Part ii of Theory 
of Knowledge, Russell chooses to discuss the understanding of a “prop-
osition” which involves a symmetrical relation of similarity. What 
makes this sort of case easier to discuss is the fact that no different 
complexes result from interchanging A and B in the complex A being 
similar to B; in Russell’s words, such a complex is “non-permutative”. 
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This, however, is not the case where asymmetrical relations such as 
precedes are involved: A precedes B is indeed quite a different complex 
from B precedes A. Complexes of this sort are called “permutative”. 
 In Chapter v, Part ii of Theory of Knowledge Russell attempts to 
solve the problem of permutation, i.e., the problem of describing un-
ambiguously the complex corresponding to the belief or judgment 
which contains asymmetrical relations like precedes. He tackles this 
problem within the framework of the correspondence theory of truth 
and argues that a belief or judgment of the form J(S, F, R, x1, x2) is 
true when there is a corresponding complex consisting of the objects 
of that belief or judgment, and otherwise false. It is clear how this 
becomes problematic when the relation R in our example is asymmet-
rical—in such a case, two different complexes result from the inter-
change of terms. As Russell sees it, the problem then becomes: “when 
several complexes can be formed of the same constituents, to ﬁnd as-
sociated complexes unambiguously determined by their constituents” 
(TK, p. 145). 
 His solution to this problem relies on: (1) the introduction of posi-
tion relations that hold between the terms and the complex; and (2) 
providing the description of the so-called “associated complexes” 
which are non-permutative and hence, according to Russell, unam-
biguously determined by their constituents. 
 Position relations, for Russell, hold between a constituent of the 
complex x1 and the complex γ, where γ refers to a complex which has 
as constituents x1, x2, and R. Thus, the ﬁrst associated complex with 
γ is x1 standing in the position relation C1 to γ	(i.e.,	x1C1γ) while the 
second associated complex is x2 standing in a different position rela-
tion C2 to γ	(i.e.,	x2C2γ). Russell takes it that the associated complexes 
are free from the problem of permutation, since the logical character 
of the constituents prevents the possibility that, say, γ could stand in 
a position relation C1 to x1. He can now provide an unambiguous des-
cription of a complex that involves an asymmetrical relation by provid-
ing descriptions of the associated complexes. In our example, the 
judgment J(S, F, R, x1, x2) comes out true if there is a complex γ such 
that x1C1γ and x2C2γ. 
 It is beyond the scope of this paper to engage with the problem of 
permutation and Russell’s solution to it in any more detail. I mention 
it here only because Russell seems committed to having position rela-
tions in both permutative and non-permutative complexes, and Map 
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A was meant to represent a dual non-permutative complex. Thus, it 
is reasonable to ask: were position relations meant to be represented 
by Russell in Map A? And if so, in what way? 
 Take again the example of the judgment J(S, F, R, x1, x2). If R is 
asymmetrical, there are two distinct position relations—C1 and C2 —
holding between terms x1 and x2 and the corresponding complex; but 
in the case of R being symmetrical, there is only one such relation C 
that holds between each of the terms x1 and x2 and the corresponding 
complex. Russell is explicit about this when he writes: “If R is sym-
metrical with respect to two constituents, two of the C’s will be iden-
tical. If R is heterogeneous with respect to two constituents, two of 
the C’s will be incompatible” (TK, p. 146). 
 Moreover, it is important to note that there seems to be nothing 
more to Russell’s notion of “position” than “standing in a position 
relation to a complex”, i.e. there is no indication of positions being 
thought of by him as analogous to empty slots or blank spaces in a 
complex (or on sides of relations). Thus, the image of something like 
“__ is similar to __” is far from what he seems to have in mind when it 
comes to the notion of “position”. With this in mind, consider the 
following passage: 
 
A complex may be called “symmetrical” with respect to two of its con-
stituents if they occupy the same position in the complex. Thus in “A and 
B are similar”, A and B occupy the same position. A complex is “unsym-
metrical” with respect to two of its constituents if the two occupy different 
positions in the complex.  (TK, pp. 122–3; italics mine)  
 
If we thought of “positions” in analogy with “slots” in a complex, then 
this passage would commit Russell to holding that there is only one 
slot in the complex of the form A being similar to B and that there are 
two entities somehow sharing (or crowding) that “slot”. But if we dis-
pense with such metaphors and take him at his word when he deﬁnes 
positions in terms of position relations, then what we have is simply 
two entities standing in the same relation to the complex they help 
constitute. 
 From these considerations about position relations, it follows that 
it is possible to read into Russell’s Map A, two identical position rela-
tions in which A and B stand to the complex. Consider it again, but 
now with the following highlighted segments: 
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Map A-4 
 
It is possible that the branching line connecting similarity to A and B 
is meant to represent S’s understanding that A and B are related by 
an identical position relation to the would-be complex and that such 
a relation is determined in the would-be complex by the symmetrical 
relating relation of similarity. The very same thing is represented also 
by the branching line connecting A and B to the form R(x, y). 
 If this is correct, then Russell might have been trying to represent 
that understanding of similarity gives the subject two things rather 
than one: an understanding that the relation of similarity is a dual re-
lation as well as the understanding that it is symmetrical. For it is due 
to the fact that the relating relation in the would-be complex is sym-
metrical that the position relations involved in such a complex are 
identical. Russell even says as much when immediately preceding the 
presentation of Map A, he writes: “because we are dealing with a 
proposition asserting a symmetrical relation between A and B, A and 
B have each the same relation to “similarity”, whereas, if we had been 
dealing with an asymmetrical relation, they would have had different 
relations to it” (TK, p. 117; italics mine). 
 This is all, of course, rather speculative; instead of endorsing the 
interpretation that sees Russell’s Map A as representing, amongst 
other things, position relations, I merely wanted to draw attention to 
the textual support in favour of such an interpretation. Though this 
reading draws nicely on some parts of Russell’s discussion of position 
relations, it also raises a number of questions. For example: if position 
relations are indeed to play a part in Map A, why didn’t Russell argue 
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that acquaintance with position relations is necessary for understand-
ing the “proposition” “A and B are similar”? And why didn’t a posi-
tion relation make it into Map A as a separate term, rather than as an 
unmarked segment of a line? Furthermore, if position relations are 
meant to hold between terms and the would-be complex, why would 
their representation in Map A (as well as the quotation above that 
precedes it) imply that they relate the terms to the relation of 
similarity? 
 It is not clear to me what the right answer to these questions might 
be, or even that there is one. As we know, there are many unﬁnished 
interesting threads in Russell’s manuscript, and this might be one of 
them. 
 
4. what is the map a map “of”? 
 
This paper has thus far assumed that with Map A Russell was trying 
to represent a particular complex—the ﬁve-term understanding com-
plex “S understands that A and B are similar”. But could it be that 
Map A was actually meant to represent the form of the ﬁve-term un-
derstanding complex rather than the complex itself ? There is certainly 
some textual support for this reading. 
 First, Russell presents the map at the end of the section in which he 
is addressing the question: “What is the logical structure of the fact 
which consists in a given subject understanding a given proposition?” 
(TK, p. 113; italics mine). As we have seen in §3.2, Russell referred to 
the logical form of the dual complex as being a structure; thus, it would 
not be a jump to read the question about the logical structure of the 
understanding complex as a question about its logical form. 
 Secondly, Russell explicitly mentions his concern with the logical 
form of the understanding complex on the page that leads up to Map 
A. He writes: 
 
Thus a ﬁrst symbol for the complex will be U {S, A, B, similarity, R(x, 
y)} . 
 This symbol, however, by no means exhausts the analysis of the form of 
the understanding complex. There are many kinds of ﬁve-term com-
plexes, and we have to decide what the kind is. 
  (TK, p. 117; italics mine) 
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This would suggest that what Russell takes himself to be engaging in 
is the analysis of the form of the understanding complex. Why is it that 
the symbol U {S, A, B, similarity, R(x, y)} is inadequate? What does 
it leave out? Clearly, it does give us the adicity of the understanding 
relation—i.e., it shows us that the complex in question is a ﬁve-term 
one, the same way that R(x, y) shows us that the would-be complex is 
dual. What more does Russell want the form to do? 
 At this point of the text, Russell starts to focus on the constituents 
of the complex and the peculiar way in which each of them enters into 
the complex. To highlight different ways in which the subject S enters 
into the complex, Russell suggests replacing it with “something”. He 
writes: “If S is replaced by ‘something’ the resulting complex is of a 
different form from that which results from replacing any other term 
by “something”. This explains what is meant by saying that S enters 
in a different way from the other constituents” (TK, p. 117). Similarly, 
Russell notes, R(x, y) enters in a different way from the other constit-
uents, and the same is the case with A, B, and similarity. 
 These comments can be seen as revealing the tension in Russell’s 
views on the form of understanding complex. On the one hand, think-
ing of logical form as an entity that solely gives us the adicity of the 
complex seems insufficient to him. But on the other hand, building 
into the logical form of the complex the particular way in which each 
of the constituents contributes to the understanding complex, seems 
difficult (or even impossible) to do. Could it be that Russell’s Map A 
was his experimental attempt at capturing this more encompassing 
notion of the form? Was he in the process of realizing that merely giv-
ing the adicity of the understanding complex, by, say, replacing the 
terms at the nodes of the map with “something” would not capture 
the true logical structure of the complex? And if so, should his holding 
onto the speciﬁc terms of the understanding relation be seen as his 
realization of this fact and as an illustration of the particular contribu-
tion that each of the terms brings to the form of the complex? 
 Whatever the answer to this question may be, it is clear that a cer-
tain shift in his thinking does occur in these pages of Theory of 
Knowledge. For by Chapter iii of Part ii Russell has decided that the 
classiﬁcation of cognitive facts “by the logical character of the objects 
involved” is “far more important than their classiﬁcation by their own 
logical form” (TK, p. 131). Thus, even if he had contemplated the idea  
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of somehow building more than adicity into the logical form of the 
complex, by this point he seems to have abandoned it. 
 
5. conclusion 
 
The purpose of this paper has been to draw the reader’s attention once 
more to the map that plays a prominent role in Russell’s presentation 
of the multiple-relation theory of judgment in Theory of Knowledge. I 
have tried to bring out different tensions in the interpretation of the 
map, and I have advanced an interpretation that sees Map A as rep-
resenting a comprehensive multiple understanding relation relating 
the subject S to A, B, similarity, and the form R(x, y). I have argued 
that such a multiple comprehensive relation relates its terms in a com-
plex way, and that this cannot be due to the nature of the relation of 
understanding itself. Rather, the relation of understanding’s complex 
way of relating is affected by the nature of the terms being related. 
Thus, Map A represents that: (1) standing in an understanding rela-
tion to the form R(x, y) helps S understand that the would-be complex 
is dual; (2) standing in an understanding relation to A and B and the 
form helps S understand that A and B are two terms that in a would-
be complex are related by a dual relation; and (3) standing in an un-
derstanding relation to similarity and the form helps S understand that 
similarity is the dual symmetrical relating relation in a would-be com-
plex. I have further pointed out that there is textual evidence to sup-
port the thesis that Map A also represents the identical position rela-
tions that relate terms A and B to similarity, though such a reading 
would raise other questions for Russell. And ﬁnally, I have wondered 
whether the map of the speciﬁc ﬁve-term understanding complex is 
supposed to be a representation of the form of such a complex for him. 
With the above discussion, I hope to have shown that Russell’s map 
deserves at least another close look and that it might hold the key to a 
better understanding of his multiple-relation theory of judgment.13 
 
 
 
 
 
13  I am most grateful to my colleague Gregory Landini for our lively discussions of the 
map and many passages of TK. Without his support and enthusiasm, I might have 
never thought that this topic was worth exploring in such detail. 
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